1. Introduction

In response to the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001 and the perceived risks to ships and the danger of ships being used for terrorist purposes, the International Maritime Organization (IMO) began extensive work towards modifying the Convention for the Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS) 1974 (as amended) and creating the new International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code. ICS represented the industry viewpoint throughout this work. An IMO diplomatic conference convened in December 2002 adopted a series of amendments to SOLAS, which include a new Chapter Xl-2 solely related to addressing ship security. A two part International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code was also adopted, Part A of which is mandatory and Part B of which is advisory.

All ships to which the Regulations and the mandatory part of the Code apply were required by 1 July 2004 (or other dates as mentioned in the individual provisions) to conform to the regulations and the ISPS Code, which require ship modifications, and establish additional equipment, documentary, information and operational requirements.
The Regulations and the ISPS Code are applicable to all passenger ships and cargo ships, including high-speed craft, of 500 gt or more, and to mobile offshore drilling units.
They also apply to port facilities serving such ships engaged on international voyages with a proviso that Contracting Governments will decide the extent of application of Part A of the ISPS Code to those port facilities within their territory which, although used primarily by ships not engaged on international voyages, are required, occasionally, to serve ships arriving or departing on an international voyage.
The Regulations and the ISPS Code do not apply to warships, naval auxiliaries or other ships owned or operated by Contracting Government and used only on non-commercial government serviced.

1.1 Background review.

A new, comprehensive security regime for international shipping has entered into force on 1st July 2004 following the adoption by the International Maritime Organization (IMO) of a series of measures to strengthen maritime security and to prevent and suppress acts of terrorism against shipping.

The Maritime Security Conference, held at the London headquarters of the IMO between 9th and 13th December 2002, was of crucial significance not only to the international maritime community but the world community as a whole, given the pivotal role shipping plays in the conduct of world trade. The measures adopted at the Conference represent the culmination of just over a year\'s intense work by IMO\'s Maritime Safety Committee and it’s Intersessional Working Group since the terrorist atrocities in the United States in September 2001.

The Conference was attended by 108 Contracting Governments to the 1974 SOLAS Convention, observers from two IMO Member States and observers from the two IMO Associate Members. United Nations specialized agencies, intergovernmental organizations and non-governmental international organizations also sent observers.

The Conference adopted a number of amendments to the 1974 Safety of Life at Sea Convention (SOLAS), the most far-reaching of which enshrines the new International Ship and Port Facility Security Code (ISPS Code).
The code contains detailed security-related requirements for Governments, port authorities and shipping companies in a mandatory section (Part A), together with a series of guidelines about how to meet these requirements in a second, non-mandatory section (Part B). The Conference also adopted a series of resolutions designed to add weight to the amendments, encourage die application of the measures to ships and port facilities not covered by the Code and pave the way for future work on the subject.
Speaking at the end of the conference, IMO Secretary-General William 0\'Neil told delegates. \"You have also succeeded, through the interest the Conference has generated worldwide, in highlighting and promoting the need for the development of a security consciousness in all that we do to complement IMO\'s existing objectives of developing a safety culture and ah environmental conscience.\"
In a call for continued vigilance, he added, \"In the meantime, all involved in the operation of ships and ports should continue to be aware of the potential dangers to shipping through acts of terrorism and the need to be extremely vigilant and alert to any security threat they might encounter in port, at offshore terminals or when underway at sea.\"








The Conference has been referred to in the United Nations General Assembly. At its current session, the General Assembly adopted a resolution on \"Oceans and the law of the sea\", which specifically welcomed initiatives at the International Maritime Organization to counter the threat to maritime security from terrorism and encouraged States fully to support this endeavor.

1.1.1 Essence and Purpose of the ISPS Code

In essence, the Code takes the approach that ensuring the security of ships and port facilities is basically a risk management activity and that to determine what security measures are appropriate, an assessment of the risks must be made in each particular case.
The purpose of the Code is to provide a standardized, consistent framework for evaluating risk, enabling governments to offset changes in threat with changes in vulnerability, for ships and port facilities.
To begin the process, each Contracting Government will conduct Port Facility Security Assessments. Such assessments have three essential components. First, they identify and evaluate important assets and infrastructures that are critical to the port facility as well as those areas or structures that if damaged, could cause significant loss of life or damage to the port facility\'s economy or environment.
Then, the assessment identify die actual threats to those critical assets and infrastructure in order to prioritise security measures.
Finally, the assessment address vulnerability of the port facility by identifying its weaknesses in physical security, structural integrity, protection systems, procedural policies, communications systems, transportation infrastructure, utilities, and other areas within a port facility that may be a likely target. Once this assessment has been completed. Contracting Governments can accurately evaluate risk.

1.1.2 Security Levels and Requirements
This risk management concept will be embodied in the Code through a number of minimum functional security requirements for ships and port facilities.

For ships, these requirements include:
· Ship security plans.
· Ship security officers.
· Company security officers.
· Certain onboard equipment.

For port facilities, the requirements include:
· Port facility security plans.
· Port facility security officers.
· Certain security equipment.

In addition the requirements for ships and tor port facilities include:
· Monitoring and controlling access.
· Monitoring the activities of people and cargo.
· Ensuring security communications are readily available.

Because each ship (or class of ship) and each port facility present different risks, the method in which they meet the specific requirements of this Code is determined and eventually approved by the Administration or Contracting Government, as the case may be.
In order to communicate the threat at a port facility or for a ship, the Contracting Government set the appropriate security level. Security Levels 1, 2, and 3 correspond to normal, medium, and high threat situations, respectively. The security level creates a link between the ship and the port facility, since it triggers the implementation of appropriate security measures for the ship and for the port facility.
The preamble to the Code states that, as threat increases, the only logical counteraction is to reduce vulnerability. The Code provides several ways to reduce vulnerabilities. Ships are being subject to a system of survey, verification, certification, and control to ensure that their security measures are implemented. This system will be based on a considerably expanded control system as stipulated in the 1974 Convention for Safety of Life at Sea (SOLAS). Port facilities also are required to report certain security related information to the Contracting Government concerned, which in turn submits a list of approved port facility security plans, including location and contact details to IMO.
Under the terms of the Code, shipping companies are required to designate a Company Security Officer for the Company and a Ship Security Officer for each of its ships. The Company Security Officer\'s responsibilities include ensuring that a Ship Security Assessment is properly carried out, that Ship Security Plans are prepared and submitted for approval by (or on behalf of) the Administration and thereafter is placed on board each ship.
The Ship Security Plan should indicate the operational and physical security measures the ship itself should take to ensure it always operates at Security Level 1. The plan should also indicate the additional, or intensified, security measures the ship itself can take to move to and operate at Security Level 2 when instructed to do so. Furthermore, the plan should indicate the possible preparatory actions the ship could take to allow prompt response to instructions that may be issued to the ship at Security Level 3.
Ships will have to carry an International Ship Security Certificate indicating that they comply with the requirements of SOLAS Chapter XI-2 and part A of the ISPS Code. When a ship is at a port or is proceeding to a port of Contracting Government, the Contracting Government has the right, under the provisions of regulation XL-119, to exercise various control and compliance measures with respect to that ship.
The ship is subject to port State control inspections but such inspections will not normally extend to examination of the Ship Security Plan itself except in specific circumstances.
The ship may, also, be subject to additional control measures if the Contracting Government exercising the control and compliance measures has reason to believe that the security of the ship has, or the port facilities it has served have, been compromised.

Each Contracting Government has to ensure completion of a Port Facility Security Assessment for each port facility within its territory that serves ships engaged on international voyages. The Port Facility Security Assessment is fundamentally a risk analysis of all aspects of a port facility\'s operation in order to determine which parts of it are more susceptible, and/or more likely, to be the subject of attach Security risk is seen a function of the threat of an attack coupled with the vulnerability of the target and the consequences of an attack.
On completion of the analysis, it will be possible to produce an overall assessment of the level of risk. The Port Facility Security Assessment will help determine which port facilities are required to appoint a Port Facility Security Officer and prepare a Port Facility Security Plan. This plan should indicate the operational and physical security measures the port facility should take to ensure that it always operates at Security Level 1. The plan should also indicate the additional, or intensified, security measures the port facility can take to move to and operate at Security level 2 when instructed to do so. It should also indicate the possible preparatory actions the port facility could take to allow prompt response to the instructions that may be issued at Security Level 3.
Ships using port facilities may be subject to port State control inspections and additional control measures. The relevant authorities may request the provision of information regarding the ship, its cargo, passengers and ship\'s personnel prior to me ship\'s entry into port. There may be circumstances in which entry into port could be denied.

Contracting Governments have various responsibilities, including setting the applicable Security Level, approving the Ship Security Plan and relevant amendments to a previously approved Plan. Verifying the compliance of ships with the provisions of SOLAS chapter XI-2 and part A of the ISPS Code and issuing the International Ship Security
Certificate, determining which port facilities located within their territory are required to designate a Port Facility Security Officer, ensuring completion and approval of the Port Facility Security Assessment and the Port Facility Security Plan and any subsequent amendments; and exercising control and compliance measures. It is also responsible for communicating information to the International Maritime Organization and to the shipping and port industries.
Contracting Governments can designate, or establish. Designated Authorities within Government to undertake their security duties and allow Recognized Security Organizations to carry out certain work with respect to port facilities, but the final decision on the acceptance and approval of this work should be given by the Contracting Government or the Designated Authority.















1.1.3 Amendments to SOLAS Chapters

The Conference adopted a series of Amendments to the 1974
SOLAS Convention, aimed at enhancing maritime security on board ships and at ship/port interface areas. Among other things , these amendments create a new SOLAS chapter dealing specifically with maritime security, which in turn contains the mandatory requirement for ships to comply with the ISPS Code.
Modifications to Chapter V (Safety of Navigation) contain a new timetable for the fitting of Automatic Identification Systems (AIS). Ships, other than passenger ships and tankers, of 300 gross tonnage and upwards but less than 50,000 gross tonnage, will be required to fit AIS not later than the first safety equipment survey after 1 July 2004 or by 31 December 2004, whichever occurs earlier. Ships fitted with AIS shall maintain AIS in operation at all times except where international agreements, rules or standards provide for the protection of navigational information.
The existing SOLAS Chapter XI (Special measures to enhance maritime safety) has been re-numbered as Chapter XI-1. Regulation XI-1/3 is modified to require ships\' identification numbers to be permanently marked in a visible place either on the ship\'s hull or superstructure. Passenger ships should carry the marking on a horizontal surface visible from the air. Ships should also be marked with their ID numbers internally.
And a new regulation XI-1/5 requires ships to be issued with a Continuous Synopsis Record (CSR) which is intended to provide an on-board record of the history of the ship. The CSR shall be issued by the Administration and shall contain information such as the name of the ship and of the State whose flag the ship is entitled to fly, the date on which the ship was registered with that State, the ship\'s identification number, the port at which the ship is registered and the name of the registered owner(s) and their registered address. Any changes shall be recorded in the CSR so as to provide updated and current information together with the history of the changes.
A brand-new Chapter XI-2 (Special measures to enhance maritime security) is added after the renumbered Chapter XI-1.
This chapter applies to passenger ships and cargo ships of 500 gross tonnage and upwards, including high speed craft, mobile offshore drilling units and port facilities serving such ships engaged on international voyages.
Regulation XI-2/3 of the new chapter enshrines the International Ship and Port Facilities Security Code (ISPS Code). Part A of this Code will become mandatory and part B contains guidance as to how best to comply with the mandatory requirements.
The regulation requires Administrations to set Security Levels and ensure the provision of Security Level information to ships entitled to fly their flag. Prior to entering a port, or whilst in a port, within the territory of a Contracting Government, a ship shall comply with the requirements for the Security Level set by that Contracting Government, if that Security Level is higher than the Security Level set by the Administration for that ship.
Regulation XI-2/4 confirms the role of the Master in exercising his professional judgment over decisions necessary to maintain the security of the ship. It says he shall not be constrained by the Company, the Charterer or any other person in this respect.

1.1.4 Ship Security Alert System

Regulation XI-2/5 requires all ships to be provided with a Ship Security Alert System, according to a strict timetable thatwillsee most vessels fitted by 2004 and the remainder by 2006. When activated the Ship Security Alert System shall initiate and transmit a ship-to-shore security alert to a competent authority designated by the Administration, identifying the ship, its location and indicating that the security of the ship is under threat or it has been compromised. The system will not raise any alarm on-board the ship_ The ship security alert system shall be capable of being activated from the navigation bridge and in at least one other location.
Regulation XI-2/6 covers requirements for port facilities, providing among other things for Contracting Governments to ensure that Port Facility Security Assessments are carried out and that Port Facility Security Plans are developed, implemented and reviewed in accordance with the ISPS Code.
Other regulations in this chapter cover the provision ot information to IMO, the control of ships in port, (including measures such as the delay, detention, restriction of operations including movement within the port, or expulsion of a ship from port), and the specific responsibility of Companies. A number of resolutions have been adopted by the

Conference an follows:
Conference resolution_01 (Adoption of amendments to the annex to SOLAS 1974, as amended)
Conference resolution_02 (Adoption of the International Ship and Port Facility Security (ISPS) Code)
Conference resolution_03 (Further work by the IMO pertaining to the enhancement of maritime security)
Conference resolution_04 (Future amendments to Chapters XI-1 and XI-2 of the 1974 SOLAS Convention on special measures to enhance maritime safety and security)
Conference resolution_05 (Promotion of technical co-operation and assistance)
Conference resolution_06 (Early implementation of the special measures to enhance maritime security)
Conference resolution_07 (Establishment of appropriate measures to enhance the security of ships, port facilities, mobile offshore drilling units on location and fixed and floating platforms not covered by chapter XI-2 of SOLAS 1974)
Conference resolution_08 (Enhancement of security in co-operation with the International Labour Organization) Conference resolution_09 (Enhancement of security in co-operation with the World Customs Organization)
Conference resolution_10 (Early implementation of long-range ships\' identification and tracking)
Conference resolution_11 (Human element-related aspects and shore leave for seafarers)

1.2 Objectives of the ISPS Code

The main objectives of the ISPS Code can be summarized in the following five (5) areas:

Detect Security Threats and Implement Security Measures: to establish an international framework involving co-operation between Contracting Governments, Government agencies, local administrations and the shipping and port industries to detect security threats and take preventive measures against security incidents affecting ships or port facilities used in international trade.
Roles for Government, maritime administrations, shipping companies and the ports industry: to establish the respective roles and responsibilities of the Contracting
Governments, Government agencies, local administrations and the shipping and port industries, at the national and international level for ensuring maritime security
Collation and promulgation of security-related information: to ensure the early and efficient collection and exchange of security-related information
Plans and procedures: to provide a methodology for security assessments so as to have in place plans and procedures to react to changing security levels
Instill confidence: to ensure confidence that adequate and proportionate maritime security measures are in place.


2. Introduction
The main aim of this chapter is to bring to the attention of ship-owners, masters and crews the precautions to be taken to reduce the risks of piracy on the high seas and armed robbery against ships at anchor, off ports or when underway through a coastal State’s territorial waters. It outlines steps that should be taken to reduce the risk of such attacks, possible responses to them and the vital need to report attacks, both successful and unsuccessful, to the authorities of the relevant coastal State and to the ships’ own maritime Administration. Such reports are to be made as soon as possible, to enable necessary actions to be taken. Without loss of generality and due to the statistical data that we are going to analyze further down this chapter the geographical area that accumulates the majority of our interest is South East Asia.

2.1. The objectives of hostile actions
In addition to hijacking of ships, and the theft of cargo, the main targets of the South East Asian attacker appear to be cash in the ship’s safe, crew possessions and any other portable ship’s equipment, even including coils of rope. In South America some piracy and armed robbery attacks are drug related. When there has been evidence of tampering with containers, it has been suggested that the raiders may initially have gained access when the ship was berthed in port and then gone over the side, with what they could carry. Thorough checking of ships’ compartments and securing before leaving ports is therefore recommended. Additionally, the crew and the master should ensure that the cargo, if valuable, is properly secured and all necessary protective measures have been taken to establish this security.
2.1.1. Initial factors providing a preliminary line of defense
Masters should bear in mind the possibility that attackers are monitoring ship-to-shore communications and using intercepted information to select their targets. Caution should, therefore, be exercised when transmitting information on cargo or valuables on board by radio in areas where attacks occur. Members of the crew going ashore in ports in affected areas should be advised not to discuss the voyage or cargo particulars with persons unconnected with the ship’s business. In the same sense vessels with a crew small in number should pay particular attention in terms of security as their number usually favors the attackers. A small crew engaged in ensuring the safe navigation of their ship through congested or confined waters will have the additional onerous task of maintaining high levels of security surveillance for prolonged periods. Ship-owners will wish to consider enhancing security watches if their ship is in waters or at anchor off ports, where attacks occur. Ship-owners will wish to consider providing appropriate surveillance and detection equipment to aid their crews and protect their ships.






2.1.2. Preventive actions required to minimize the chance of hostile encounters
All ships expected to operate in waters where attacks occur should have a ship security plan, which pertains to piracy and armed robbery against ships. The ship security plan should be prepared having regard to the risks that may be faced, the crew members available, their capability and training, the ability to establish secure areas on board ship and the surveillance and detection equipment that has been provided. The plan should cover key areas such as the following:
1. The need for enhanced surveillance and the use of lighting, surveillance and detection equipment.
2. Crew responses, if a potential attack is detected or an attack is underway.
3. The radio alarm procedures to be followed.
4. The reports to be made after an attack or an attempted attack.
Ship security plans should ensure that masters and crews are made fully aware of the risks involved during attacks by pirates or armed robbers. In particular, they should address the dangers that may arise if a crew adopts an aggressive response to an attack. Early detection of a possible attack is the most effective deterrent. Aggressive responses, once an attack is underway and, in particular, once the attackers have boarded the ship, could significantly increase the risk to the ship and those on board. In accordance with the ship security plan, all doors allowing access to the bridge, engine room, steering gear compartments, officers’ cabins and crew accommodation should be secured and controlled in affected areas and should be regularly inspected. The intention should be to establish secure areas which attackers will find difficult to penetrate. It is important that any response to an incident is well planned and executed, and those involved should be as familiar as possible with a ship environment. Therefore those responsible within the security forces for responding to acts of piracy and armed robbery against ships, whether at sea or in port, should be trained in the general layout and features of the types of ships most likely to be encountered and ship-owners should co-operate with the security forces in providing access to their ships to allow the necessary on board familiarization.
2.1.3. Revision and proper execution of ship security plan is the key to a proper defense
Prior to entering an area, where attacks have occurred, the ship’s crew should have practiced and perfected the procedures set down in the ship security plan. Alarm signals and procedures should have been thoroughly practiced. If instructions are to be given over the ship’s address systems or personal radios, they must be clearly understood by those who may not have fully mastered the language in which the instructions will be given. It cannot be emphasized enough that all possible access points to the ship and any key and secure areas on it must be secured or controlled in port, at anchor and when underway in affected areas. Crews should be trained in the use of any additional surveillance or detection equipment installed on the ship. Planning and training must be on the basis that an attack will take place and not in the belief that with some luck it will not happen. Indications to attackers that the ship has an alert and trained crew implementing a ship security plan will help to deter them from attacking the ship. The Company Security Officer, Vessel Security Officer, and appropriate shore-based personnel generally should have knowledge and receive training taking into account the guidance given by relevant circulars. Vessel personnel having specific security duties and responsibilities should understand their responsibilities for vessel security as described in the Vessel Security Plan and generally have sufficient knowledge and ability to perform their assigned duties. Training may include, but not limited to, the following, as appropriate:
· Security administration;
· Relevant international conventions, codes and recommendations;
· Responsibilities and functions of other involved organizations;
· Risk, threat and vulnerability assessments;
· Security surveys and inspections;
· Vessel and waterfront facility security measures;
· Recognition of characteristics and behavioral patterns of peoples who are likely to commit unlawful act;
· Inspection, control and monitoring techniques;
· Techniques used to circumvent security measures;
· Recognition and detection of prohibited weapons, dangerous substances and devices;
· Vessel and local port operations and conditions;
· Security devices and systems; and
· Methods, policy and procedures of physical searches.

The submitting associations consider that the provisions related to training are much too detailed. Aim of the Code is to provide an international framework through which ships and port facilities can co-operate to detect security threats and take preventive measures. It is not the objective to develop training guidelines.
Routing and delaying anchoring
If at all possible, ships should be routed away from areas where attacks are known to have taken place and, in particular, seek to avoid bottle-necks. If ships are approaching ports where attacks have taken place on ships at anchor, rather than ships underway, and it is known that the ship will have to anchor off port for some time, consideration should be given to delaying anchoring by slow steaming or longer routing to remain well off shore thereby reducing the period during which the ship will be at risk. Contact with port authorities should ensure that berthing priorities are not affected. Charter party agreements should recognize that ships may need to delay arrival at ports where attacks occur either when no berth is available for the ship or offshore loading or unloading will be delayed for a protracted period.
Precautions at anchor or in port
In areas where attacks occur it is important to limit, record and control those who are allowed access to a ship when in port or at anchor. Photographing those who board the ship can be a useful deterrent or assist the identification of attackers who may have had access to the ship prior to their attack. Film need only be developed in the event of a subsequent attack. Given that attackers may use knowledge of cargo manifests to select their targets, every effort should be made to limit the circulation of documents, which give information on the cargoes on board or their location on the ship. Prior to leaving port the ship should be thoroughly searched and all doors or access points secured or controlled. This is particularly important in the case of the bridge, engine room, steering space and other vulnerable areas. Doors and access points should be regularly checked thereafter. The means of controlling doors or access points which would need to be used in the event of an onboard emergency will need careful consideration. Ship or crew safety should not be compromised. Security guards employed in port or at anchorage on different ships should be in communication with each other and the port authorities during their watch. The responsibility for vetting such guards, lies with the security personnel companies, which themselves should be vetted by the appropriate authorities.
Watch keeping and vigilance
Maintaining vigilance is essential. All too often the first indication of an attack has been when the attackers appear on the bridge or in the master’s cabin. Advance warning of a possible attack will give the opportunity to sound alarms, alert other ships and the coastal authorities, illuminate the suspect craft, undertake evasive maneuvering or initiate other response procedures. Signs that the ship is aware it is being approached can deter attackers. When ships are in, or approaching areas where attacks take place, bridge watches and lookouts should be augmented. Additional watches on the stern or covering radar “blind spots” should be considered. Companies should consider investing in low-light binoculars for bridge staff and lookouts. Radar should be constantly manned but it may be difficult to detect low profile fast moving craft on ship’s radars. Yacht radar mounted on the stern may provide additional radar cover capable of detecting small craft approaching from astern when the ship is underway. Use of appropriately positioned yacht radar when the ship is at anchor may also provide warning of the close approach of small craft. It is particularly important to maintain a radar and visual watch for craft which may be trailing the ship when underway but which could close in quickly when mounting an attack. Small craft, which appear to be matching the speed of the ship on a parallel or following course, should always be treated with suspicion. When a suspect craft has been noticed, it is important that an effective all-round watch is maintained for fear the first craft is a decoy with the intention to board the ship from a second craft while attention is focused on the first. Companies owning ships that frequently visit areas where attacks occur should consider the purchase and use of more sophisticated visual and electronic devices in order to augment both radar and visual watch capability against attackers’ craft at night, thereby improving the prospects of obtaining an early warning of a possible attack. In particular, the provision of night vision devices, small radars to cover the blind stern arcs, closed circuit television and physical devices, such as barbed wire, may be considered. In certain circumstances non-lethal weapons may also be appropriate. Infrared detection and alerting equipment may also be utilized.





Secure areas
In accordance with the ship security plan, all doors allowing access to the bridge, engine room, steering gear compartments, officers’ cabins and crew accommodation should be secured and controlled at all times and should be regularly inspected. The intention should be to establish secure areas which attackers will find difficult to penetrate. Consideration should be given to the installation of special access control systems to the ship’s secure areas. Ports, scuttles and windows, which could provide access to such secure areas should be securely closed and should have laminated glass, if possible. Deadlights should be shut and clipped tightly. The internal doors within secure areas which give immediate access to key areas such as the bridge, radio room, engine room and master’s cabin, should be strengthened and have special access control systems and automatic alarms. Securing doors providing access to, and egress from, secure or key areas may give rise to concern over safety in the event of an accident. In any situation where there is a conflict between safety and security, the safety requirements should be paramount. Nevertheless, attempts should be made to incorporate appropriate safety provisions while allowing accesses and exits to be secured or controlled. Owners may wish to consider providing closed-circuit television (CCTV) coverage and recording of the main access points to the ship’s secure areas, the corridors approaching the entrances to key areas and the bridge. To prevent seizure of individual crewmembers by attackers - seizure and threatening a crew member is one of the more common means of attackers gaining control over a ship - all crew members not engaged on essential outside duties should remain within a secure area during the hours of darkness. Those whose duties necessarily involve working outside such areas at night should remain in constant communication with the bridge and should have practiced using alternative routes to return to a secure area in the event of an attack. Crewmembers who fear they may not be able to return to a secure area during an attack, should select places in advance in which they can take temporary refuge. There should be designated muster areas within the ship’s secure areas where the crew can muster during an attack and communicate their location and numbers to the bridge.
Alarms
Alarm signals, including the ship’s whistle, should be sounded on the approach of attackers. Alarms and signs of response can discourage attackers. Alarm signals or announcements which provide an indication at the point at which the attacker may board, or have boarded, may help crew members in exposed locations select the most appropriate route to return to a secure area.



Preventive procedures ensuring safe communications prior to potential breach of security

The master should ensure that an authorized person responsible for communications is on duty at all times when the ship is in, or approaching, areas where attacks occur. Prior to entering areas where attacks have occurred and where the GMDSS installation on board does not have facility for automatically updating the “ship position” data from an associated electronic navigation aid, it is strongly recommended to enter the ship’s position at regular intervals into the appropriate communications equipment manually. It is recommended that owners initiate the GMDSS INMARSAT “C” alarm program before entering affected areas for use when appropriate 25 A constant radio watch should be maintained with the appropriate shore or naval authorities when in areas where attacks have occurred. Continuous watch should also be maintained on all distress and safety frequencies, particularly VHF Channel 16 and 2,182 kHz, as well as in any other channels or frequencies which could have been determined by local authorities for certain areas. Ships should also ensure all maritime safety information broadcasts for the area monitored. As it is anticipated that INMARSAT’s enhanced group calling system (EGC) will normally be used for such broadcasts using the Safety NET service, owners should ensure a suitably configured EGC receiver is continuously available when in, or approaching areas where there is risk of attack. Owners should also consider fitting a dedicated receiver for this purpose, i.e. one that is not incorporated into a Ship Earth Station used for commercial purposes to ensure no urgent broadcasts are missed. The International Maritime Organization (IMO) recommends in MSC/Circ.597, issued in August 1992, that reports concerning attacks by pirates or armed robbers should be made to the relevant Rescue Co-ordination Centre (RCC) for the area. MSC/Circ.597 also recommends that Governments should arrange for the RCCs to be able to pass reports of attacks to the appropriate security forces. If suspicious movements are identified which may result in an imminent attack, the ship is advised to contact the relevant RCC or with the radio stations which could have been recommended by local authorities for certain areas. Where the master believes these movements could constitute a direct danger to navigation, consideration should be given to broadcasting an “All stations (CQ)” “danger message” as a warning to other ships in the vicinity as well as advising the appropriate RCC. A danger message should be transmitted in plain language on a VHF working frequency following an announcement on VHF Channel 70 using the “safety” priority. All such measures shall be preceded by the safety signal (Sécurité). When, in his/her opinion, there is conclusive evidence that the safety of the ship is threatened, the master should immediately contact the relevant RCC or, in certain areas, with the radio stations which could have been recommended by local authorities, and if considered appropriate, authorize broadcast of an “All Stations” “Urgent Message” on VHF Channel 16, 2,182 kHz or any other radio communications service he/she considers appropriate or which could have been recommended by local authorities; e.g. INMARSAT, etc. All such messages shall be preceded by the appropriate Urgency signal (PAN PAN) and/or a DSC call on VHF Channel 70 and/or 2,187.5 kHz using the “all ships urgency” category. If the
Urgency signal has been used and an attack does not, in fact, develop, the ship should cancel the message as soon as it knows that action is no longer necessary. This message of cancellation should likewise be addressed to “all stations” Should an attack occur and, in the opinion of the master, the ship or crew are in grave and imminent danger requiring immediate assistance, he/she should immediately authorize the broadcasting of a distress message, preceded by the appropriate distress alerts (MAYDAY, DSC, etc.), using all available radio communications systems. To minimize delays, if using a ship earth station, ships should ensure the coast earth station associated with the RCC is used. The ship may be able to send a covert piracy/terrorist alert to an RCC. However, as pirates/terrorists may be on board the ship and within audible range of the communication equipment, when the RCC sends an acknowledgement of receipt and attempts to establish communication, they could be alerted to the fact that a piracy/terrorist alert has been transmitted. This knowledge may serve to further endanger the lives of the crew on board the ship. RCCs and others should, therefore, be aware of the danger of unwillingly alerting the pirates/terrorists that a distress alert or other communication has been transmitted by the ship. Masters should bear in mind that the distress signal is provided for use only in case of imminent danger and its use for less urgent purposes might result in insufficient attention being paid to calls from ships really in need of immediate assistance. Care and discretion must be employed in its use, to prevent its devaluation in the future. Where the transmission of the Distress signal is not fully justified, use should be made of the Urgency signal. The Urgency signal has priority over all communications other than distress.
Use of distress flares
The only flares authorized for carriage on board ship are intended for use if the ship is in distress and is in need of immediate assistance. As with the unwarranted use of the Distress signal on the radio (see paragraph 24 above), use of distress flares simply to alert shipping rather than to indicate that the ship is in grave and imminent danger may reduce their effect in the situations in which they are intended to be used and responded to. Radio transmissions should be used to alert shipping of the risk of attacks rather than distress flares. Distress flares should only be used when the master considers that the attackers’ actions are putting his/her ship in imminent danger.
Evasive maneuvering and use of hoses
Provided that navigational safety allows, masters should consider “riding off” attackers craft by heavy wheel movements as they approach. The effect of the bow wave and wash may deter would-be attackers and make it difficult for them to attach poles or grappling irons to the ship. Maneuvers of this kind should not be used in confined or congested waters or close inshore or by ships constrained by their draught in the confined deep-water routes found, for example, in the Malacca and Singapore Straits.

The use of water hoses should also be considered though they may be difficult to train if evasive maneuvering is also taking place. Water pressures of 80 lb per square inch and above have deterred and repulsed attackers. Not only does the attacker have to fight against the jet of water but the flow may swamp his/her boat and damage engines and electrical systems. Special fittings for training hoses could be considered which would also provide protection for the hose operator. A number of spare fire hoses could be rigged and tied-down in order to be pressurized at short notice if a potential attack is detected.
Employing evasive maneuvers and hoses must rest on a determination to successfully deter attackers or to delay their boarding to allow all crewmembers to gain the sanctuary of secure areas. Continued heavy wheel movements with attackers on board may lessen their confidence that they will be able to return safely to their craft and may persuade them to disembark quickly. However, responses of this kind could lead to reprisals by the attackers if they seize crewmembers and should not be engaged in unless the master is convinced he can use them to advantage and without risk to those on board. They should not be used if the attackers have already seized crewmembers.
Suspected piracy/armed robbery vessel detected
Early detection of suspected attacks must be the first line of defense. If the vigilance and surveillance has been successful, a pirate/armed robbery vessel will be detected early. This is the stage at which the security forces of the nearest littoral or coastal State must be informed through the RCC, using the ships’ message format contained in appendix 2. The ship’s crew should be warned and, if not already in their defensive positions, they should move to them. Evasive maneuvers and hoses should be vigorously employed as detailed in the preparation phase.
Being certain that piracy/armed robbery will be attempted
If not already in touch with the security forces of the littoral coastal State, efforts should be made to establish contact. Crew preparations should be completed and, where a local rule of the road allows ships under attack to do so, a combination of sound and light signals should be made to warn other ships in the vicinity that an attack is about to take place. Vigorous maneuvering should be continued and maximum speed should be sustained if navigation conditions permit.
Pirate/armed robbery vessel in proximity to, or in contact with, own ship
Vigorous use of hoses in the boarding area should be continued. It may be possible to cast off grappling hooks and poles, provided the ship’s crew, are not put to unnecessary danger.
Pirates/armed robbers start to board ship
Timing during this phase will be critical and as soon as it is appreciated that a boarding is inevitable all crew should be ordered to seek their secure positions.
Pirates/armed robbers have succeeded in entering ship
Early detection of potential attacks must be the first line of defence, action to prevent the attackers actually boarding the second, but there will be incidents when attackers succeed in boarding a ship. The majority of pirates and armed robbers are opportunists seeking an easy target and time may not be on their side, particularly if the crew are aware they are on board and are raising the alarm. However, the attackers may seek to compensate for the pressure of time they face by escalating their threats or the violence they employ.
When attackers are on board the actions of the master and crew should be aimed at:
· securing the greatest level of safety for those on board the ship;
· seeking to ensure that the crew remain in control of the navigation of the ship
· securing the earliest possible departure of the attackers from the ship.
The options available to the master and crew will depend on the extent to which the attackers have secured control of the ship, e.g. by having gained access to the bridge or engine room, or by seizing crew members who they can threaten, to force the master or crew to comply with their wishes. However, even if the crew are all safely within secure areas, the master will always have to consider the risk to the ship the attackers could cause outside those areas, e.g. by using firebombs to start fires on a tanker or chemical carrier.
If the master is certain that all his/her crew are within secure areas and that the attackers cannot gain access or by their actions outside the secure areas they do not place the entire ship at imminent risk, then he/she may consider undertaking evasive manoeuvres of the type referred to above to encourage the attackers to return to their craft.
The possibility of a sortie by a well-organized crew has, in the past, successfully persuaded attackers to leave a ship but the use of this tactic is only appropriate if it can be undertaken at no risk to the crew. For an action like this to be attempted the master must have clear knowledge of where the attackers are on the ship, that they are not carrying firearms or other potentially lethal weapons and that the number of crew involved significantly outnumbers the attackers they will face. If a sortie party can use water hoses, they stand an increased chance of success. The intention should be to encourage the attackers back to their craft. Crew members should not seek to come between the attackers and their craft nor should they seek to capture attackers as to do so may increase the resistance the attackers offer which will, in turn, increase the risk faced by members of the sortie party. Once outside the secure area, the sortie party should always stay together. Pursuit of an individual attacker by a lone crew member may be attractive but if it results in the crew member being isolated and seized by the attackers, the advantage turns to the attackers. Crew members should operate together and remain in constant communication with the bridge and should be recalled if their line of withdrawal to a secure area is threatened. If the crew do apprehend an attacker, he/she should be placed in secure confinement and well cared for. Arrangements should be made to transfer him/her to the custody of officers of the security forces of a coastal State at the earliest possible opportunity. Any evidence relating to this activities should also be handed over to the authorities who take him/her into custody.

The pirates/armed robbers have stolen property/money, etc.
At this stage it is essential that the pirates/armed robbers are assured that they have been given everything they demand and a strong reassurance that nothing has been secreted may persuade the pirates/armed robbers to leave.
The pirates/armed robbers start to disembark from the ship
If the crew are in their secure positions, it would be unwise of them to leave this security until it is confirmed that the pirates/armed robbers have left the ship.
The pirates/armed robbers have disembarked from the ship
A pre-arranged signal on the ship’s siren will alert the crew to the “all clear”.
Action after an attack and reporting incidents
Immediately after securing the safety of the ship and crew a post attack report (Follow-up report, as shown in Ships’ message formats in appendix 2) should be made to the relevant RCC and, through them, to the security forces of the coastal State concerned. As well as information on the identity and location of the ship, any injuries to crew members or damage to the ship should be reported as should the direction in which the attackers departed together with brief details of their numbers and, if possible, a description of their craft. If the crew have apprehended an attacker, that should also be reported in this report.
If an attack has resulted in the death of, or serious injury to, any person on board the ship or serious damage to the ship itself, an immediate report should also be sent to the ship’s maritime Administration. In any event a report of an attack is vital if follow-up action is to be taken by the ship’s maritime Administration.
Any CCTV or other recording of the incident should be secured. If practicable, areas that have been damaged or rifled should be secured and remain untouched by crew members pending possible forensic examination by the security forces of a coastal State. Crew members who came into contact with the attackers should be asked to prepare an individual report on their experience noting, in particular, any distinguishing features which could help subsequent identification of the attackers. A full inventory, including a description of any personal possessions or equipment taken, with serial numbers when known, should also be prepared.
As soon as possible after the incident, a fuller report should be transmitted to the authorities of the coastal State in whose waters the attack occurred or, if on the high seas, to the authorities of the nearest coastal State. Due and serious consideration should be given to complying with any request made by the competent authorities of the coastal State to allow officers of the security forces to board the ship, take statements from crew members and undertake forensic and other investigations. Copies of any CCTV recordings, photographs, etc. should be provided if they are available.
Ships should take the necessary precautions, and implement the necessary procedures to ensure rapid reporting of any case of attack or attempted attack to the authorities in the relevant coastal States to enhance the possibility of security forces apprehending the attackers.
Any report transmitted to a coastal State should also be transmitted to the ship’s maritime Administration at the earliest opportunity. A complete report of the incident, including details of any follow-up action that was taken or difficulties that may have been experienced, should eventually be submitted to the ship’s maritime Administration. The report received by maritime Administrations may be used in any diplomatic approaches made by the flag State to the Government of the coastal State in which the incident occurred. This will also provide the basis for the report to IMO.
The format required for reports to IMO through maritime Administrations or international organizations is attached at appendix 4. Indeed, at present the lack of adequate and accurate reporting of attacks is directly affecting the ability to secure governmental and international action. Reports may also contribute to future refining and updating any advice that might be issued to ships.
Reports to the RCC, coastal State and the ship’s maritime Administration should also be made if an attack has been unsuccessful.
Using RCCs, as recommended by IMO in MSC/Circ.597, will eliminate communication difficulties.
On leaving piracy/armed robbery threat areas
On leaving piracy/armed robbery threat areas, shipmasters should make certain that those spaces that need to be unlocked for safety reasons are unlocked, unrig hoses and revert to normal watchkeeping/lighting.




2.3 Reliability Analysis Techniques

The most frequently used reliability analysis techniques are:
· Failure Mode and Effect Analysis (FMEA)
· Fault Tree Analysis (FTA)
· Event Tree Analysis (ETA)
This section of the chapter gives an overview of these techniques:

2.3.1 Failure mode and effects analysis (FMEA)

Failure Mode and Effects Analysis (FMEA) is a technique to make an inventory of all failure modes of each piece of equipment, and their effect on the system or plant. The emphasis is on hardware failure. A risk analysis applies this technique, when he wants to answer the question ”what can go wrong with this system?”
A failure mode is the number of different ways a piece of equipment or operation can fail. Some examples are shown in Table 3.

System Failure Modes
Belt conveyor system · Belt snaps· Roller bearing fails· Roller seizes· Conveyor collapses
Actuated valve in a fluid pipeline · Fails to open· Fails to close· Internal leakage· External leakage
Pressure control system · Fails High· Fails Low· Degraded· Erratic

Table 3: Examples of failure modes

FMEA identifies single failure modes that play a significant part in an accident or loss event. The analysis is not efficient for identifying combinations of equipment failures that lead to accidents. Human errors are not usually considered specifically in FMEA, even though the effects of mal-operation are usually included in an equipment failure mode.


2.3.1.2 Significant failure modes
The significant failure modes for components are listed below.
· failure to open/close/start/stop or continue operation
· spurious failure
· degradation
· erratic behaviour
· scheduled service/replacement
· external/ internal leakage.
Most components would fall in one of the above categories
2.3.2 FMEA Methodology
The FMEA methodology involves completing an FMEA table by systematically examining every piece of equipment and recording all failure modes that may be possible. For each failure mode, immediate effected and expected events are recorded.

A typical FMEA data sheet is shown in Table 4.

Often it is useful to extend a FMEA to include criticality ranking (Failure Modes, Effect and Criticality Analysis-FMECA). Here each failure mode would be ranked according to a chosen scheme.

FMEA is a qualitative technique and measures of significance are qualitatively assessed, as shown: in Table 5.

Rating of conditions Result of personal error, deficiency or inadequacy of design or malfunction
Safe No major degradation of performance, no equipment damage or personnel injury.
Marginal Degradation of performance, which can be counteracted or controlled without major damage or injury to personnel.
Critical Degradation of performance, or damage to equipment requiring immediate corrective action for personnel or equipment survival.
Catastrophic Severe degradation of performance with subsequent equipment loss and/or death or multiple injuries to personnel.

Table 5: Qualitative measures of significance in FMEA Source: US Department of Navy 1977

The completed FMEA or FMECA is a systematic tabulation of the effects of equipment failure within a process or system. Equipment failures with an unacceptable criticality ranking should be re-examined to verify the failure modes and their effects, and to reduce or eliminate them if a failure could lead to a serious accident.

The methodology consists of the following steps:
1. Define the complete functional boundaries of the system to be analysed. This is done by marking up a set of drawings and annotating them to show their functional limits and dependencies.
2. Define the level of detail. It is necessary to decide whether the study will be conducted at component level, or at sub-component level. For example, if a centrifugal pump is one component in the system, a component level analysis might include the failure modes of the pump (stopped, racing, low output, cavitating, seal leakage etc.). A sub-component level analysis will have to look at each of the elements that make up the pump (casing, impeller, shaft, seal, drive motor etc).
3. Very often, sub-component level of detail is not required, unless there is a specific need based on the type of application, e.g. nuclear or aerospace industry. As a compromise, major sub-components may be included.
4. FMEA data sheet. The main elements of a data sheet are shown in Table 2.2. The sheet typically includes the following:
Ψ Header information describing the system being studied, drawing references, list of team members, date and location of study etc.
Ψ Component identified. This would include a functional identifier, (e.g. boiler feedwater pump), an identification tag that can be tied to a drawing, and reference to the system or subsystem of which the component is a part.
Ψ Failure mode. This should be concise, and realistic. A failure frequency may be included, based on the information in Tables 6 and 7 (derived from industry \'norms\').



Rating of frequency Failures/Hour of operation
Probable 1 in 104
Reasonably probable 1 in 104 - 105
Remote 1 in 104 – 107
Extremely remote 1 in > 107

Table 6: Qualitative measures of frequency (components)

Rating of human error frequency/performance Situation Probability of error/operation
Low Routine 0.0001 – 0.001
High Emergency 0.1 – 0.9

Table 7: Qualitative measures of frequency (human factors)

· Effect on system. This requires examination of the failure mode from a multidisciplinary perspective by the team. This mainly depends on the expertise of the team, and available documentation, and is the most critical aspect of the study.
· A severity ranking may be included, based on the way the failure mode affects the system, using Table 5 as a guide.
· Method of failure detection. For high severity (critical or higher) consequences, it is necessary to provide some form of failure detection. The method may detect incipient failures before they become critical. If no detection exists, the team may develop one and include it in the study recommendations. The detection method could be procedural, e.g. regular inspection and testing.
· System and operator response. The response may include:
Ψ Ability of the automatic controls to absorb the effects of failure, if the design includes this capability.
Ψ Ability of the operator to respond to the failure in time. This should be realistic and not too optimistic.
Ψ Resolutions on any additional hardware, or changes to procedures required.

Documents required for the study
The following documents are required as a minimum, for the FMEA/FMECA study.
· Project design basis
· Engineering line diagrams (these are also referred to as Piping and Instrumentation Diagrams or P&IDs) in the process industries
· Electrical line diagram
· System description
· Instrument logic or ladder diagrams
· Instrument loop diagrams.

Other useful documents are:

· training manuals
· system operating procedures
· vendor manuals for equipment.

2.3.2.1 Selection of team members
An FMEA is normally conducted by a team of two or possibly three people. The right experience is necessary for the team members.

2.3.2.2 Qualifications for the team leader
· Prior experience with equipment involving broad exposure to the causes and effects of transients and equipment failures.
· Knowledge of system engineering involving both controls and mechanical or electrical design.
· Ability to organise, train, and manage a team of analysts using the FMEA technique.

The FMEA method is mainly hardware oriented, and looks at one component at a time. It does not generate the detailed functional relationships and interactions that is produced by more thorough techniques. Therefore, what is lacking in details in the, method is made up from the prior knowledge and experience of the team leader.

2.3.2.3 Qualifications for other team members
· A systems engineer or operations specialist familiar with the design and operation of the system.
· A controls specialist, preferably familiar with both electrical and control design, logic, and equipment used.

Sometimes, if the team leader does not have all the requirements (which is not unusual for any single person), this can be supplemented by the skills of a team member.

2.3.2.4 Human error
It is possible to apply the FMEA technique to human error situations. This is a vast subject on its own and some aspects are described in the next section on hazard and operability studies.

2.3.2.5 Review of documentation
The worksheets produced in the analysis should be critically reviewed by the team to ensure that the judgments on the frequency and criticality ranking are appropriate. This may require additional information outside the team’s experience.

2.3.2.6 Method of documentation
The basic document produced in an FMEA is the handwritten worksheet, a typed version of which is illustrated in Table 4. Commercial data bases that enable the information to be recorded on laptops during meetings, using custom designed templates, are increasing being used as an alternative to handwritten sheets.

2.3.2.7 Advantages
The major advantages of FMEA are the ease of construction at component level and quick identification of critical failures in a properly conducted study. It is useful for machinery and material handling systems compared to other techniques. Further, for systems with predominantly linear interactions, FMEA provides the simplest way of identifying and correcting potential failures that would have an adverse effect on system performance.

FMEA also provides valuable information on the failure modes, which could be used in more sophisticated techniques such as fault tree analysis for quantification of system failure frequency.

2.3.2.8 Limitations
There are a number of limitations on the range of applicability of the FMEA technique. These are:
· It addresses only one component at a time, and may not reveal the complex and hidden interactions in the subsystem and between subsystems in the system.
· It does not provide sufficient detail for quantification of system consequences.

It should be noted that FMEA and FMECA are useful when used in conjunction with three other hazard analysis tools. These are Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP), and Fault Tree Analysis (FTA) and Event Tree Analysis (ETA) where contributing equipment failure leads to a stated hazard. These techniques will de described in the following pages.

2.3.3 Hazard and operability study (HAZOP)

The Hazard and Operability Study (HAZOP) is a fundamental approach that can be applied to almost any operational situation, be it simple or complex. It is a structured, open-ended method that is used to stimulate the thought processes of a small team of qualified and experienced people.

2.3.3.1 What is it?
The hazard and operability study, commonly referred to as HAZOP, is a systematic examination of the design or operation of an installation, as represented by layout and engineering diagrams with all control and instrumentation and sequence of operations shown, design documents and operations manuals. Deviations from the design value of key parameters are studied, using guidewords to control the examination evaluation.
In the chemical process plants, the design is given in what is known as a piping and instrumentation diagram (P&ID). In the manufacturing context the operation is represented as an engineering diagram. This diagram is a schematic representation of the material flow with all operational controls and protection devices shown on each item of equipment. A hazard and operability study is undertaken by a group of senior representatives from design, project and oper

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